When a firm is regulated under multiple environmental programs, its compliance behavior under these programs can be complementary or substituting-regulations of one program either increase or decrease firm compliance with other programs. This paper examines the existence and the nature of such cross program effects. A panel data model with panel corrected standard error (PCSE) is estimated using data on facilities regulated under both the air program (Clean Air Act, CAA) and the hazardous waste program (Reservation and Conservation Recovery Act, RCRA). Results show evidence of negative cross program effects of RCRA regulations on facility compliance with CAA. Increases in RCRA inspections and RCRA penalties as well as the threat of an RCRA inspection result in facilities complying less with CAA regulations. Furthermore, facilities that are regulated under other programs such as Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and Clean Water Act (CWA) show less compliance than other facilities. Positive withinprogram effects are found, with the threat of a CAA inspection and actual CAA penalty imposing positive effects on CAA compliance. In addition, unemployment rates are negatively related to compliance while population density is positively related to compliance. 
I. Introduction
When a firm is regulated by multiple environmental programs, the firm may manage its compliance with these programs systematically so that regulation of one program can affect firm decisions regarding compliance with other programs. Specifically, this cross program effects on compliance can be complementary or substituting, in that regulations of one program may either increase or decrease firm compliance with other programs. Such relationships reflect the spillover effects across environmental programs. This paper examines the existence and nature of the spillover effects by asking whether monitoring and enforcement actions taken under one program increase, decrease or have no effects on firm compliance with other programs.
The study of spillover effects across environmental programs can reveal important policy implications. When regulations are not independent, optimal monitoring and enforcement strategies require coordination between the two programs. Consider the situation where an increase in a firm's abatement level under program A increases its marginal abatement cost under program B. As a result of the increase, the firm's optimal abatement level (and hence its compliance under program B) decreases, although the monitoring and enforcement parameters under that program remain unchanged. 1 This substitution within regulations means certain emissions are crowded out from one program to the other.
That is, a firm reduces its emissions under program A, but emits more under program B due to the increased marginal abatement costs under program B. From a society's perspective, substituting programs result in increased total abatement costs and higher social optimal level of emissions. Following the same reasoning, complementary regulations result in lower total abatement costs and lower social optimal level of emissions. In either case, coordination among regulators is required to achieve the social optimum.
To date, the majority of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of environmental monitoring and enforcement has focused on single medium program. Grey and Shimshack (2011) provided the most recent literature review on this topic. In their review, the spillover effects are defined as the impact of regulatory actions aimed at one facility on the environmental performance of other facilities. Such spillover effects are found in Shimshack and Ward (2005) , Gray and Shadbegian (2007) , and Decker and Pope (2005) . The spillover effects discussed in this paper refer to the effects of regulatory actions under one program on facility compliance with other programs. The only paper that discusses such spillover effects is Liu (2012) . Using data on facilities in Michigan, Liu (2012) Unlike the RCRA program in which compliance status is available only if a facility is inspected, the CAA program requires regulated facilities to self-report; therefore, compliance status at the source level is available on a monthly basis. 2 The detailed compliance data produce better econometric analysis for the purpose of investigations of the effects of monitoring and enforcement on compliance. Third, the panel data model selected for this study explicitly controls for potential heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation; these issues are not considered in Liu (2012) .
Other empirical literature on monitoring and enforcement is suggestive. For example, Botre et al. (2007) show that technological innovation in automotive catalytic converters results in lower nitrogen oxides but increased ozone. Sigman (1996) and Gamper-Rabindran (2006) find that changes in regulations can lead firms to transfer pollutants from a regulated medium such as air to a different 2 The issue of self-reporting will be discussed in details in the next section. Kaplow and Shavell (1994) shows that under certain conditions individuals can be induced to truthfully self-report their status. Empirically selfreported data are widely used in studies of monitoring and enforcement (see Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Earnhart, 2004a; Shimshack and Ward, 2005) . Some of the literature uses self-reported data directly without addressing potential issues. When self-reported data are tested explicitly in other studies, their accuracy cannot be rejected. In addition, as stated in Shimshack and Ward (2005) , sanctions on intentional misreporting range from criminal fines to jail time. Thus, facilities face strong incentives to truthfully report their status.
According to Earnhart (2004a) , community characteristics may also play important roles in facility emissions and compliance decisions. Therefore, community characteristics are obtained to control for potential influence of community pressures on facility compliance. The major data sources for these characteristics include the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the U. S. Census Bureau. The control variables include real annual income per capita, unemployment rate, college graduate rates, minority rate, and population density at the county level. For counties without detailed statistics, the corresponding state level statistics are used instead.
In selecting facilities to be included in the analysis the following criteria are used. First, the facilities must be regulated under both CAA and RCRA since the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of RCRA regulation on CAA compliance. Second, the facilities should be federally reportable since enforcement and compliance data on such facilities are more reliable. 4 Third, government facilities are excluded from the sample since their compliance behavior and enforcement history can be systematically different from non-government facilities. Overall, a total of 5,849 facilities are included in the analysis; the time frame for the sample is 2001-2010. 5, 6 The distribution of facilities across the nation is summarized in Table 1 . Among all the states considered in the sample, Pennsylvania has the highest number of facilities (about 11% of the 5,849 facilities) while Vermont has the lowest number with about 9 facilities. Variable descriptions and summary statistics are provided in Table 2 . The first variable, CAA compliance, is the number of months that facilities are in compliance in a given year. Overall, the facilities are in compliance for 10.61 months on average. About 54.3% of the facilities are in compliance throughout the ten years while 24.6% of them are never in compliance over the same period. The set of variables from CAA inspection to RCRA penalty are inspections and penalties under the two programs in the previous year. The average annual CAA penalty lagged one year is $6400, while the average annual RCRA penalty lagged one year is $540. The penalties variables are included with natural log transformation. The average number of annual CAA inspections lagged one year is 0.79; one particular facility is inspected 28 times in a certain year. The number of annual RCRA inspections lagged one year is just 0.33, but the maximum number of inspections is as high as 71 in a certain year for one particular facility. The average number of annual CAA inspections of other facilities than the given facility in the same state is .78, which is similar to the average number of inspections on the given facility. The dummy variables, CWA and TRI, identify other environmental programs to which the facility is subject. More than half of the facilities included in the analysis are subject to TRI reporting while about 51% of the facilities are regulated by CWA. The next two dummy variables MACT and SIP denote two specific programs within the CAA program. About 44% of the facilities are regulated under MACT and 12% regulated under SIP. Industry differences are captured broadly using the variable Manufacturing. The dependent variable is facility compliance with CAA regulation. Due to estimation consideration, monthly compliance data are summarized on a yearly basis. The summarized yearly data might lose certain information that is embedded with the detailed monthly data. However, if monthly data are used and estimated using panel data models for binary dependent variables such as logit or probit models, facilities whose compliance status never changed are dropped from the estimation due to the lack of variation. About 54.3% and 24.6% of facilities are either always in compliance or never in compliance.
If binary estimations are carried out, only 21.1% of the original sample are used and thus information provided by those excluded facilities are ignored. Therefore, the dependent variable is the number of month a facility is in compliance in a given year.
Following previous literature on compliance, the monitoring and enforcement measures considered here are sorted into specific and general deterrence (Grey and Shimshack, 2011). The specific deterrence included monitoring and enforcement actions taken at a specific facility. The general deterrence included the threat of enforcement actions and the spillover effects defined in Grey and In summary, the econometric model can be expressed as follows:
, where C it denotes the number of compliance months in a given year, i denotes the facility, t denotes time, E includes all monitoring and enforcement measures, G denotes other control variables 7 The heteroscedasticity test is carried out using Stata's xttest3, while the test for autocorrelation is carried out using Stata's xtserial. 8 Another concern is fixed-effects versus random-effects. While fixed-effects models may have advantages over random effects models, adopting fixed-effects models can be problematic since some of the important facility characteristics are time-invariant and thus will be excluded from the estimation. Excluding important facility characteristics may result in certain variables being insignificant or even showing the opposite signs. A similar issue is documented in Earnhart (2004b) , where certain monitoring and enforcement variables are either insignificant or show the opposite signs when "systematic differences across facilities" are not adequately controlled for. 9 Even though the dependent variable is the number of months a facility is in compliance, the typical panel data count model is inappropriate. The count model requires the events of the counts to be independent. However a facility's compliance status can be dependent from one month to the next. In particular, a facility's violation status can last for months if a major violation is found, and it difficult to correct.
including facility specific characteristics and community characteristics, is the year dummy, is the state dummy, k denotes the state, and is PCSE error. insignificant. In terms of the specific deterrence, one unit increase in the log of CAA penalty increases facility compliance by 0.02 month on average in a given year, which translates to an increase of roughly 0.14 month of compliance for every $1000 increase in CAA penalty. CAA inspection shows significant but negative effects on CAA compliance at the 10% level with a coefficient of -0.03. The negative effects of CAA inspection is unexpected and deserve further examination. First, this may arise from targeting enforcement. According to Harford (1991) , who first proposed the targeting enforcement theory, targeting noncompliant facilities with more frequent inspections or higher penalties can achieve efficiency while minimizing regulatory costs. Empirical evidence in support of targeting regulation is found later in Helland (1998) . Facilities with noncompliance behavior under CAA may be targeted by the regulators with more frequent inspections, and therefore negative relationship is found between compliance and inspection. Second, it is also possible that facilities inspected in the previous year expect lower inspection probabilities in the current year and thus put less effort in abatement and compliance. This possibility is further supported by the results of the logit model shown in the Appendix. The negative and significant coefficient of lagged CAA inspection in the logit model indicates that facilities inspected in the previous year face lower probability of being inspected in the current year. If facilities correctly anticipated this, they may have reduced compliance in response. Table 3 Estimation results Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
III. Results and Discussion
***Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
State and year dummies are included in the regression but not reported here.
In terms of the spillover effects across programs, all RCRA monitoring and enforcement variables are associated with negative and significant coefficients. Thus, negative cross program effects are confirmed and the relationship between CAA and RCRA is substituting. Among the RCRA variables, the threat of an RCRA inspection shows the highest impact on CAA compliance with a coefficient of -2.57.
RCRA inspection is significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of -0.05. That is, for every additional RCRA inspection, a facility's compliance is expected to decrease by 0.05 month on average in a given year, ceteris paribus. Lastly, RCRA penalty also shows significant and negative effects on CAA compliance. A unit increase in the log of RCRA penalty can reduce facility compliance with CAA by 0.02 month on average in a given year, which is equivalent to a decrease of about 0.14 month for every $1000 increase in RCRA penalty. In addition, the negative cross program effects are further supported by the dummy variables that represent other environmental programs. Facilities regulated under TRI or CWA show less compliance than others, based on the negative and significant coefficients associated with TRI and CWA.
The finding of a substitution relationship between the two programs bears important policy implications. When evaluating monitoring and enforcement actions, regulators usually consider the benefits and cost of such actions and make decisions within the same program. However, substituting regulations imply that for a regulator, the effects of monitoring and enforcement actions are not limited to the benefit of improved compliance within the same program. Given the negative spillover effects across the two programs, CAA and RCRA, regulators should also take into account the decreased compliance with CAA caused by monitoring and enforcement actions in RCRA. To achieve the social optimal levels of abatement and emissions, regulators of the two programs should coordinate their monitoring and enforcement actions.
The negative spillover effects confirmed in this study is in contrast to the findings in Liu (2012) , in which positive spillover effects are found. Notice that this study focus on facility compliance with CAA while Liu (2012) examines facility compliance with RCRA. The two programs can be different in various aspects and these differences may cause the contrasts in the findings of the two studies. Also the abatement technology under each media can be different and thus contributes to the contrast in findings.
In addition, results from one state may not be readily extended so as to be applicable to the whole nation.
The rest of the control variables have limited impacts on compliance. Within the CAA program, facilities subject to MACT comply less while those regulated under SIP have better compliance record. In terms of the community characteristic, unemployment rate is negatively related to compliance with a coefficient of -0.16 and population density shows positive effects on compliance with a coefficient of 0.05. Both of these two variables are significant at the 1% level.
Given that certain monitoring and enforcement variables are also included in the logit models to predict the probabilities of CAA and RCRA inspections, one concern is that the predicted probabilities may interact with those monitoring and enforcement variables when they are all included in Model 1. In fact, the coefficients associated with the predicted probabilities are much higher than those associated with the actual monitoring and enforcement variables, which further confirms the concern. 10 To check the consistency of the findings in Model 1, a second model is estimated in which the predicted probabilities are excluded. The results are shown in the last column of given that the signs of the coefficients are consistent between the two models, the conclusion of positive within program effects and negative cross program effects remain valid. Therefore, the spillover effect is negative and the relationship between the two programs is substituting.
IV. Conclusion
This paper investigates firm compliance with multiple environmental regulations. Using data on facilities that are regulated under both CAA and RCRA across the nation, a panel data model with PCSE correction is used to examine the within-program effects and cross program effects. The within-program effects refer to the impact of regulatory measures on compliance within the same program, while the cross-program effects refer to the impact of regulatory measures under one program on compliance under other programs.
As expected, the within program effects are positive. The threat of inspections and actual penalties under CAA improve facility compliance with CAA significantly. In comparison to previous findings, the cross-program effects are found to be negative. The threat of inspections and actual inspections as well actual penalties under RCRA induce facilities to comply less with CAA. Therefore, the RCRA program has negative spillovers on the CAA program and the two programs are substituting.
In addition, facilities subject to other environmental programs like CWA and TRI are also shown to comply less with CAA, which provides further evidence in support of the substitution. Given the findings, coordination among regulators is called for to achieve social optimum. When regulators take monitoring and enforcement actions under RCRA, further consideration should be given to the effects of those actions on facility compliance with other programs such as CAA. ***Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 1% level.
Year 2001 and 2007 dummies are dropped due to collinearity.
